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Abstract. We introduce a class of finite strategic games with the property that every deviation of a coalition
of players that is profitable to each of its members strictly decreases the lexicographical order of a certain
function defined on the set of strategy profiles. We call this property theLexicographical Improvement
Property (LIP)and show that it implies the existence of a generalized strong ordinal potential function. We
use this characterization to derive existence, effici ncy and fairness properties of strong Nash equilibria.
We then study a class of games that generalizes congestion games with bottleneck objectives that we call
bottleneck congestion games. We show that these games possess the LIP and thus the above mentioned
properties. For bottleneck congestion games in networks, we identify cases in which the potential function
associated with the LIP leads to polynomial time algorithmscomputing a strong Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we investigate the LIP for infinite games. We show that the LIP does not imply the existence of a
generalized strong ordinal potential, thus, the existenceof SNE does not follow. Assuming that the function
associated with the LIP is continuous, however, we prove exist nce of SNE. As a consequence, we prove
that bottleneck congestion games with infinite strategy spaces and continuous cost functions possess a
strong Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The theory of non-cooperative games is used to study situations hat involve rational and selfish agents
who are motivated by optimizing their own utilities rather than reaching some social optimum. In such
a situation, a state is called a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if it is stable in the sense that no player has
an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its strategy. While the PNE concept excludes the possibility
that a single player can unilaterally improve her utility, it does not necessarily imply that a PNE is
stable against coordinated deviations of a group of playersif their joint deviation is profitable for
each of its members. So when coordinated actions are possible, the Nash equilibrium concept is not
sufficient to analyze stable states of a game.
To cope with this issue of coordination, we adopt the solution c ncept of astrong equilibrium
(SNE for short) proposed by Aumann [4]. In a strong equilibrium, no coalition (of any size) can
deviate and strictly improve the utility of each of it members (while possibly lowering the utility of
players outside the coalition). Clearly, every SNE is a PNE,but the converse does not always hold.
Thus, even though SNE may rarely exist, they form a very robust and appealing stability concept.
One of the most successful approaches in establishing existence of PNE (as well as SNE) is the
potential function approach initiated by Monderer and Shapley [24] and later generalized by Holzman
and Law-Yone [15] to strong equilibria: one defines a real-valued functionP on the set of strategy
profiles of the game and shows that every improving move of a coalition (which is profitable to each
of its members) strictly reduces (increases) the value ofP. Since the set of strategy profiles of such
a (finite) game is finite, every sequence of improving moves reach s a SNE. In particular, the global
minimum (maximum) ofP is a SNE. The main difficulty is, however, that for most games it is hard
to prove or disprove the existence of such a potential functio .
Given that the existence of a real-valued potential is hard to etect, we derive in this paper an
equivalent property (Theorem 1) that we call thelexicographical improvement property (LIP). We
consider strategic gamesG= (N,X,π), whereN is the set of players,X the strategy space, and players
experience private non-negative costsπi(x), i ∈ N, for a strategy profilex. We say thatG has the LIP
if there exists a functionφ : X→ Rq+,q ∈ N, such that every improving move (profitable deviation
of an arbitrary coalition) fromx ∈ X strictly reduces the sorted lexicographical order ofφ(x) (see
Definition 4). We say thatG has theπ-LIP if G satisfies the LIP withφi(x) = πi(x), i ∈ N, that is,
every improving move strictly reduces the lexicographicalorder of the players’ private costs. Clearly,
requiringq= 1 in the definition of the LIP reduces to the case of a generalizd strong ordinal potential.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. We first studyesirable properties of arbitrary
finite and infinite games having the LIP andπ-LIP, respectively. These properties concern the exis-
tence of SNE, efficiency and fairness of SNE, and computability of SNE. Secondly, we identify an
important class of games that we term bottleneck congestiongames for which we can actually prove
theπ-LIP and, hence, prove that these games possess SNE with the abov desirable properties. In the
following, we will give an informal definition of bottleneckcongestion games.
Let us first recall the definition of a standard congestion game. In a congestion game, there is a
set of elements (facilities), and the pure strategies of players are subsets of this set. Each facility has
a cost that is a function of itsload, which is usually a function of the number (or total weight) of
players that select strategies containing the respective facility. The private cost of a player’s strategy
in a standard congestion game is given by thesumover the costs of the facilities in the strategy. In
a bottleneck congestion game, the private cost function of aplayer is equal to the cost of themost
expensivefacility that she uses (L∞-norm of the vector of players’ costs of the strategy).
Before we outline our results, we briefly explain the importance of bottleneck objectives in con-
gestion games with respect to real-world applications. Referring to previous work by Keshav [16],
Cole et al. [9] pointed out that the performance of a communication network is closely related to the
performance of its bottleneck (most congested) link. This behavior is also stressed by Banner and
Orda [5], who studied Nash equilibria in routing games with bottleneck objectives. Similar observa-
tions are reported by Qiu et al. [26], who investigated the applicability of theoretical results of selfish
routing models to realistic models of the Internet.
1.1 Our Results
We characterize games having the LIP by means of the existence of a generalized strong ordinal po-
tential function. The proof of this characterization is constructive, that is, given a gameG having the
LIP for a functionφ, we explicitely construct a generalized strong ordinal potential P. We further in-
vestigate games having theπ-LIP with respect to efficiency and fairness of SNE. Our characterization
implies that there are SNE satisfying various efficiency and fairness properties, e.g., bounds on the
prices of stability and anarchy, Pareto optimality, and min- ax fairness.
We establish that bottleneck congestion games possess theπ-LIP and, thus, possess SNE with the
above mentioned properties. Moreover, our characterization of games having the LIP implies that bot-
tleneck congestion games possess the strong finite improvement property. For bottleneck congestion
games in networks, we identify cases in which SNE can be computed in polynomial time.
It is worth noting that for singleton congestion games, Even-Dar et al. [12] and Fabrikant et
al. [13], have already proved existence of PNE by arguing that the vector of facility costs decreases
lexicographically for every improving move. Andelman et al. [3] used the same argument to establish
even existence of SNE in this case. Our work generalizes these results to arbitrary strategy spaces
and more general cost functions. In contrast to most congestion games considered so far, we require
only that the cost functions on the facilities satisfy threeproperties: ”non-negativity”, ”independence
of irrelevant choices”, and ”monotonicity”. Roughly speaking, the second and third condition assume
that the cost of a facility solely depends on the set of players using the respective facility and that this
cost decreases if some players leave this facility. Thus, thi framework extends classicalload-based
models in which the cost of a facility depends on the number ortotal weight of players using the
respective facility. Our assumptions are weaker than in theload-based models and even allow that the
cost of a facility may depend on thes tof players using this facility.
We then study the LIP ininfinite games, that is, games with infinite strategy spaces that can be
described by compact subsets ofRp, p ∈ N. We first show that our characterization of finite games
with the LIP does not hold anymore (essentially resembling Debreu’s impossibility result [10]). We
prove, however, that continuity ofφ in the definition of LIP is sufficient for the existence of SNE. Our
existence proof is constructive, that is, we outline an algorithm whose output is a SNE.
We consequently introduceinfinite bottleneck congestion games. An infinite bottleneck conges-
tion game arises from a bottleneck congestion gameG by allowing players to fractionally distribute a
certaindemandover the pure strategies ofG. We prove that these games have theπ-LIP provided that
the cost functions on the facilities are non-negative and non-decreasing. It turns out, however, that
the functionπ may be discontinuous on the strategy space (even if the cost functions on the facilities
are continuous). Thus, the existence of SNE does not immediately follow. We solve this difficulty by
generalizing the LIP. As a consequence, we obtain for the first time the existence of SNE for infi-
nite bottleneck congestion games with non-decreasing and co tinuous cost functions. Forbounded
cost functions on the facilities (that may be discontinuous), we show thatα-approximate SNE exist
for everyα > 0. Finally, we show thatα-approximate SNE can be computed in polynomial time for
bottleneck congestion games in networks.
In the final section, we show that our methods presented in this paper also apply to a more general
framework.
1.2 Related Work
The SNE concept was introduced by Aumann [4] and refined by Bernheim et al. [6] to Coalition-
Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE), which is a state that is stable against those deviations, which are
themselves resilient to further deviations by subsets of the original coalition. This implies that every
SNE is also a CPNE, but the converse need not hold.
Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal [28] and further studied by Monderer and Shap-
ley [24]. Holzman and Law-Yone [15] studied the existence ofSNE in congestion games with mono-
tone increasing cost functions. They showed that SNE need not exist in such games and gave a struc-
tural characterization of the strategy space for symmetric(and quasi-symmetric) congestion games
that admit SNE. Based on the previous work of Monderer and Shapley [24], they also introduced the
concept of astrong potential function: a function on the set of strategy profiles that decreases forev-
ery profitable deviation of a coalition. Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [29] further explored the existence
of (correlated) SNE in congestion games with non-increasing cost functions.
A further generalization of congestion games has been proposed by Milchtaich [23], where he
allows for player-specific cost functions on the facilities(see also Mavronicolas et al. [21], Gairing
et al. [14] and Ackermann et al. [1] for subsequent work on weighted congestion games with player-
specific cost functions). Under restrictions on the strategy space (singleton strategies), Milchtaich
proves existence of pure Nash equilibria. As shown by Voorneveld et al. [31], the model of Konishi
et al. [17] is equivalent to that of Milchtaich, which is worth noting as Konishi et al. established the
existence of SNE in such games.
Several authors studied the existence and effici ncy (price of anarchy and stability) of PNE and
SNE in various specific classes of congestion games. For example, Even-Dar et al. [12] showed that
job scheduling games (on unrelated machines) admit a PNE by arguing that the load-lexicographically
minimal schedule is a PNE. Fabrikant et al. [13] considered ascheduling model in which the process-
ing time of a machine may depend on the set of jobs scheduled onthe respective machine. For this
model, they proved existence of PNE analogous to the proof ofEven-Dar et al. Andelman et al. [3]
considered scheduling games on unrelated machines and proved that the load-lexicographically min-
imal schedule is even a SNE. They further studied differences between PNE and SNE and derived
bounds on the (strong) price of anarchy and stability, respectively. Chien and Sinclair [8] recently
studied the strong price of anarchy of SNE in general congestion games.
Bottleneck congestion games with network structure have been considered by Banner and Orda [5].
They studied existence of PNE in the unsplittable flow and in the splittable flow setting, respectively.
They observed that standard techniques (such as Kakutani’sfixed-point theorem) for proving exis-
tence of PNE do not apply to bottleneck routing games as the private cost functions may be dis-
continuous. They proved existence of PNE by showing that bottleneck games are better reply secure,
quasi-convex, and compact. Under these conditions, they recall Reny’s existence theorem [27] for bet-
ter reply secure games with possibly discontinuous privatecost functions. Banner and Orda, however,
do not study SNE. We remark that our proof of the existence of SNE is direct and constructive.
Bottleneck routing withnon-atomicplayers and elastic demands has been studied by Cole et
al. [9]. Among other results they derived bounds on the priceof anarchy in this setting. For subsequent
work on the price of anarchy in bottleneck routing games withatomic and non-atomic players, we
refer to the paper by Mazalo et al. [22].
2 Preliminaries
We consider strategic gamesG = (N,X,π), whereN = {1, . . . ,n} is the non-empty and finite set of
players,X =

i∈N Xi is the non-empty strategy space, andπ : X→ Rn+ is the combinedprivate cost
function that assigns a private cost vectorπ(x) to each strategy profilex ∈ X. These games are cost
minimization games and we assume additionally that the private cost functions are non-negative. A
strategic game is calledfinite if X is finite.
We use standard game theory notation; for a coalitionS ⊆ N we denote by−S its complement
and byXS =

i∈S Xi we denote the set of strategy profiles of players inS.
Definition 1 (Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE)).A strategy profile x is a strong Nash equilibrium if
there is no coalition∅ , S ⊆ N that has an alternative strategy profile yS ∈ XS such thatπi(yS, x−S)−




) ∈ X×X is called animproving move(or profitable deviation) of coalitionS if
πi(xS, x−S)−πi(yS, x−S) > 0 for all i ∈ S. We denote byI (S) the set of improving moves of coalition
S ⊆ N in a strategic gameG = (N,X,π) and we setI := ⋃S⊆N I (S). We call a sequence of strategy
profilesγ = (x0, x1, . . . ) an improvement pathif every tuple (xk, xk+1) ∈ I for all k= 0,1,2, . . . . One can
interpret an improvement path as a path in the so calledimprovement graphG(G) derived fromG,
where every strategy profilex ∈ X corresponds to a node inG(G) and two nodesx, x′ are connected
by a directed edge (x, x′) if and only if (x, x′) ∈ I . We are interested in conditions that assure that every
improvement path is finite. A necessary and sufficient condition is the existence of a generalized
strongordinal potential function, which we define below (see also the potential function approach
initiated by Monderer and Shapley [24], which has been generaliz d to strong potentials by Holzman
and Law-Yone [15]).
Definition 2 (Generalized strong ordinal potential game).A strategic game G= (N,X,π) is called
a generalized strong ordinal potential gameif there is a function P: X→ R such that P(x)−P(y) > 0
for all (x,y) ∈ I. P is called a generalized strong ordinal potential of the game G.
In recent years, much attention has been devoted to games admitting the finite improvement property
(FIP), that is, each path of single-handed (one player) deviations is finite. Equivalently, we say that
G has the strong finite improvement property (SFIP) if every improvement path is finite. Clearly, the
SFIP implies the FIP, but the converse need not be true.
It is known that both the SFIP and the existence of a generalizd strong ordinal potential are hard
to prove or disprove for a particular game. We define a class ofgames that we callgames with the
Lexicographical Improvement Property (LIP)and show that such games possess a generalized strong
ordinal potential. For this purpose, we will first define the sorted lexicographical order.
Definition 3 (Sorted lexicographical order). Let a,b ∈ Rq+ and denote bỹa, b̃ ∈ R
q
+ be the sorted
vectors derived from a,b by permuting the entries in non-increasing order, that is,ã1 ≥ · · · ≥ ãq and
b̃1 ≥ · · · ≥ b̃q. Then, a isstrictly sorted lexicographically smallerthan b (written a≺ b) if there exists
an index m such that̃ai = b̃i for all i <m, andãm< b̃m. The vector a isorted lexicographically smaller
than b (written a b) if either a≺ b or ã= b̃.
Roughly speaking, the lexicographical improvement property of a strategic game requires that a
vector-valued functionφ : X→ Rq+ is strictly decreasing with respect to the sorted lexicographical
order onRq+ for every improvement step.
Definition 4 (Lexicographical improvement property, π-LIP). A finite strategic game G= (N,X,π)
possesses thel xicographical improvement property(LIP) if there exist q∈ N and a functionφ : X→
R
q
+ such thatφ(x) ≻ φ(y) for all (x,y) ∈ I. G has theπ-LIP if G has the LIP forφ = π.
Clearly, the functionφ is a generalized strong ordinal potential ifq= 1. The next theorem (proof
is given in the appendix) states that requiring the LIP is equivalent to requiring the existence of a
generalized strong ordinal potential, regardless ofq.
Theorem 1. Let G= (N,X,π) be a finite strategic game. Then, the following statements are equiva-
lent.
1. G has the SFIP
2. G(G) is acyclic (contains no directed cycles)
3. G has a generalized strong ordinal potential
4. G has the LIP
5. There existsφ : X→ Rq+ and M∈ N such that P(x) =
∑q
i=1φi(x)
M is a generalized strong ordinal
potential function for G.
Corollary 1. Every finite strategic game G= (N,X,π) with the LIP possesses a strong Nash equilib-
rium.
Next, we provide an explicit formula to obtain a generalizedstrong ordinal potential function for
a strategic game satisfying the LIP. The proof is given in theappendix.








and choose M> log(q)φmax/ǫmin. Then, PM(x)=
∑q
i=1φi(x)
M is a generalized strong ordinal potential
for G.
Corollary 3. Let G= (N,X,π) be a finite game satisfying the LIP for a functionφ : X→Rq+. Then, the




3 Properties of SNE in Games with theπ-LIP
As the existence of SNE in games with the LIP is guaranteed, itis natural to ask which properties these
SNE may satisfy. In recent years, several notions of effici ncy have been discussed in the literature,
see Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [19]. We here cover the pric of stability, the price of anarchy,
Pareto optimality and min-max-fairness.
3.1 Price of Stability and Price of Anarchy
We study the efficiency of SNE with respect to the optimum of a predefined social cost function. In
this context, two notions have evolved, thestrong price of anarchymeasures the ratio of the cost of
the worst SNE and that of the social optimum. Thestrong price of stabilitymeasures the ratio of the
cost of the best SNE and that of the social optimum. Given a game G = (N,X,π) and a social cost
function C : X→ R+, whose minimum is attained in a strategy profiley ∈ X, let XSNE⊆ X denote
the set of strong Nash equilibria. Then, the strong price of anarchy forG with respect toC is de-
fined as supx∈XSNEC(x)/C(y) and the strong price of stability forG with respect toC is defined as
inf x∈XSNEC(x)/C(y).
We will consider the following natural social cost functions: the sum-objective orL1-norm defined
asL1(x) =
∑




the min-max objective orL∞-norm defined asL∞(x) =maxi∈N{πi(x)}.
Theorem 2. Let G be a strategic game with theπ-LIP. Then, the strong price of stability w.r.t. L∞ is
1, and for any p∈ R, the strong price of stability w.r.t. Lp is strictly smaller than n.
The proof of this theorem as well as a matching lower bound forp= 1 and a lower bound on the price
of anarchy are given in the appendix.
3.2 Pareto Optimality
Pareto optimality, which we define below, is one of the fundamental concepts studied in economics,
see Osborne and Rubinstein [25]. For a strategic gameG = (N,X,π), a strategy profilex is called
weakly Pareto efficient if there is noy ∈ X such thatπi(y) < πi(x) for all i ∈ N. A strategy profilex
is strictly Pareto efficient if there is noy ∈ X such thatπi(y) ≤ πi(x) for all i ∈ N, where at least one
inequality is strict.
So strictly Pareto efficient strategy profiles are those strategy profiles for whichevery improve-
ment of a coalition of players is to the expense of at least oneplayer outside the coalition. Pareto
optimality has also been studied in the context of congestion games, see Chien and Sinclair [8] and
Holzman and Law-Yone [15]. Clearly, every SNE is weakly Pareto optimal. We will show strict Pareto
optimality of SNE in games having theπ-LIP. For the proof of the next result, we refer to Section 3.3
in which an even stronger result is proved.
Corollary 4. Let G be a finite strategic game having theπ-LIP. Then, there exists a SNE that is strictly
Pareto optimal.
3.3 Min-Max-Fairness
We next define the notion of min-max fairness, which is a central topic in resource allocation in
communication networks, see Srikant [30] for an overview and pointers to the large body of research
in this area. While strict Pareto efficiency requires that there is no alternative profile which improves
the cost for a single player without strictly deterioratingthe costs of the other players, the notion
of min-max-fairness is stricter. Formally, a profilex is calledmin-max fairif for any other strategy
profile y with πi(y) < πi(x) for somei ∈ N, there exists eitherj ∈ N/{i} such thatπ j(x) ≥ πi(x) and
π j(y) > π j(x), or there existsj ∈ N/{i} such thatπ j(x) < πi(x) andπ j(y) ≥ πi(x). Note that in contrast
to Pareto efficiency, an improvement that increases the cost of a player with smaller original cost is
allowed (up to the thresholdπi(x)). It is easy to see that every min-max-fair strategy profileconstitutes
a strict Pareto optimum, but the converse need not hold.
Corollary 5. Let G be a finite strategic game having theπ-LIP. Then, there exists a SNE that is
min-max fair.
The corollary is proved in the appendix.
4 Bottleneck Congestion Games
We now present a rich class of games satisfying theπ-LIP. We call these gamesbottleneck conges-
tion games. They are natural generalizations of variants of congestion games. In contrast to standard
congestion games, we focus onmakespan-objectives, that is, the cost of a player when using a set
of facilities only depends on the highest cost of these facilities. For the sake of a clean mathematical
definition, we introduce the general notion of a congestion model.
Definition 5 (Congestion model).A tupleM = (N,F,X, (cf ) f∈F) is called acongestion modelif
N = {1, . . . ,n} is a non-empty, finite set of players, F= {1, . . . ,m} is a non-empty, finite set of facilities,
and X=

i∈N Xi is the set of strategies. For each player i∈ N, her collection of pure strategies Xi
is a non-empty, finite set of subsets of F. Given a strategy profile x, we defineN f (x) = {i ∈ N : f ∈
xi} for all f ∈ F. Every facility f∈ F has a cost function cf :

i∈N Xi → R+ satisfying
Non-negativity: cf (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X
Independence of Irrelevant Choices:cf (x) = cf (y) for all x,y ∈ X withN f (x) =N f (y)
Monotonicity: cf (x) ≤ cf (y) for all x,y∈ X withN f (x) ⊆ N f (y).
Bottleneck congestion games generalize congestion games in the definition of the cost functions on
the facilities. For bottleneck congestion games, the only requirements are that the costcf (x) on facility
f for strategy profilex only depends on the set of players usingf in their strategy profile and that
costs are increasing with larger sets.
Definition 6 (Bottleneck congestion game).LetM = (N,F,X, (cf ) f∈F) be a congestion model. The
correspondingbottleneck congestion gameis the strategic game G(M) = (N,X,π) in which π is
defined asπ =






A bottleneck congestion game with|xi | = 1 for all xi ∈ Xi and i ∈ N will be called singleton
bottleneck congestion game. We remark that our condition ”Independence of Irrelevant Choices”
is weaker than the one frequently used in the literature. In Ko ishi et al. [7,17,18], the definition
of ”Independence of Irrelevant Choices” requires that the strategy spaces are symmetric and, given
a strategy profilex = (x1, . . . , xn), the utility of a playeri depends only on her own choicexi and
the cardinality of the set of other players who also choosexi. Our definition does neither require
symmetry of strategies, nor that the utility of playeri only depends on the set-cardinality of other
players who also choosexi. For the relationship between games considered by Konishi et al. and
congestion games, see the discussion in Voorneveld et al. [31].
We are now ready to state our main result concerning bottleneck congestion games, providing a
large class of games that satisfies theπ-LIP.
Theorem 3. Let G(M) be a bottleneck congestion game with allocation modelM. Then, G fulfills
the LIP for the functionsφ : X→ Rn+ andψ : X→ Rmn+ defined as








cf (x) if f ∈ xi
0 else
for all i ∈ N, f ∈ F.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Note that the functionυ : X→ Rm with x 7→ (cf (x)
)
f∈F does not fulfillυ(x) ≻ υ(y) for all (x,y) ∈ I .
However, this property is satisfied if facility cost functions are strictly monotonic.
As a corollary of Theorem 3 we obtain that each bottleneck congestion game has theπ-LIP and
hence possesses the SFIP. In addition, the results on price of stability, Pareto optimality and min-max-
fairness apply. We now proceed by giving some examples of bottleneck congestion games.
4.1 Scheduling Games
A special case of bottleneck congestion games are scheduling games on identical, restricted, related
and unrelated machines. These games are allocation games byr tricting the strategy space for every
player to singletons and defining the appropriate cost functio s on the facilities.
Corollary 6. Scheduling games on identical, restricted, related and unrelated machines are bottle-
neck congestion games.
The existence of SNE (as well as efficiency properties of SNE) has been established before by Andel-
man et al. [3] by arguing that the lexicographically minimalschedule is a strong Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
Interference games are motivated by resource allocation prblems in wireless networks. Consider a
set ofn terminals that want to connect to one out ofm available base stations. Terminals assigned
to the same base station impose interferences among each other as they use the same frequency
band. We model the interference relations using an undirected interference graphD = (V,E), where
V = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of vertices/terminals and an edgee= (v,w) between terminalsv,w has a non-
negative weightwe ≥ 0 representing the level of pair-wise interference. We assume that the service
quality of a base stationj is proportional to the total interferencew( j), which is defined asw( j) =
∑
(v,w)∈E:xv=xw= j w(v,w).
We now obtain an interference game as follows. The nodes of the graph are the players, the set of
strategies is given byXi = {1, . . . ,m}, i = 1, . . . ,n, that is, the set of base stations, and the private cost
function for every player is defined asπi(x) = w(xi), i = 1, . . . ,n. Thus, interference games fit into the
framework of singleton bottleneck congestion games withm facilities.
Corollary 7. Interference games are bottleneck congestion games.
Note that in interference games, we crucially exploit the prope ty that cost functions on facilities
depend on the set of players using the facility, that is, their identity determines the resulting cost.
Most previous game-theoretic works addressing wireless networks only considered Nash equilibria,
see for instance Liu et al. [20] and Etkin et al. [11].
4.3 Bottleneck Routing in Networks
A special case of bottleneck congestion games are bottleneck routing games. Here, the set of facilities
are the edges of a directed graphD = (V,A). Every edgea ∈ A has a load dependent cost functionca.
Every player is associated with a pair of vertices (si , ti) (commodity) and a fixed demanddi > 0 that
she wishes to send along the chosen path inD connectingsi to ti . The private cost for every player
is the maximum arc cost along the path. Bottleneck routing games have been studied by Banner and
Orda [5]. They, however, did not study existence of strong Nash equilibria. We state the following
result.
Corollary 8. Bottleneck routing games are bottleneck congestion games.
This result establishes that these games possess the SFIP. To the best of our knowledge, our result
establishes for the first time that bottleneck routing gamespossess the FIP. Banner and Orda [5] only
proved that every improvement path of best-response dynamics is finite.
By using a reduction fromk-Directed Disjoint Paths, Banner and Orda [5] proved that, given a
valueB, it is NP-hard to decide if a bottleneck routing game withk commodities and identical cost
functions possesses a PNEx with L∞(x) ≤ B. We can slightly strengthen this result by reducing from
2-Directed Disjoint Pathsshowing hardness already for 2 commodities. While every SNEis also a
PNE, the above hardness result also carries over to SNE.
We will show that for single-commodity instances with unit demands and non-decreasing identi-
cal cost functions, there is a polynomial time algorithm forc mputing a SNE, see the appendix for
the proof.
Theorem 4. Consider a bottleneck routing game on a directed graphD = (V,A) with identical non-
decreasing arc-cost functions and n players having unit demand each that have to be routed from a
common source to a common sink. Then, there is a polynomial tie algorithm computing a SNE.
To the best of our knowledge, our result establishes for the first time an efficient algorithm com-
puting a SNE in this setting. For the next result, we assume the unit cost model of arithmetic opera-
tions, that is, we assume that every arithmetic operation can be done in constant time, regardless of
the required precision. Furthermore, we assume that cost func ions on the facilities are bounded by a
constantC ∈ N that is polynomially bounded with respect to the input size.Now, consider a bottle-
neck routing gameG on a directed graphD = (V,A) with arc-costsc and constantC. By scaling every
cost function ofG with the factor 1/C, we obtain the bottleneck routing gameG̃. It is easy to see that
SNE coincide in both games. Moreover,ca(x)/C ≤ 1 for all a∈ A andx∈ X, thus, (ca(x)/C)M ≤ 1 for
everyM > 0. This construction enables us to establish an effici nt algorithm computing SNE even for
non-identical arc-costs (proof can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 1. Consider a class of bottleneck routing games on directed graphsD = (V,A) with
convex arc-cost functions ca,a ∈ A, that are bounded by a constant C, and players having a unit
demand each that must be routed from a common source to a common sink. Then, there is a polynomial
algorithm computing a SNE for every game in this class.
Note that the SNE computed with the algorithm proposed in Proposition 1 need not to coincide
with the strict Pareto optimal strategy as shown in Example 4given in the appendix. We also illustrate
in Example 5 structural differences between singleton bottleneck congestion games andbottleneck
routing games.
5 Infinite Strategic Games
We now considerinfinite strategic games in which the players’ strategy sets are topological spaces
and the private cost functions are defined on the product topology.
Formally, an infinite game is a tupleG = (N,X,π), whereN = {1, . . . ,n} is a set of players, and
X = X1× · · · × Xn is the set of pure strategies, where we assume thatXi ⊆ Rni , i ∈ N are compact
sets, andp=
∑
i∈N ni . The cost function for playeri is defined by a non-negative real-valued function
πi : X→ R+, i ∈ N.
As in the previous section, we are interested in conditions fr establishing existence of a gener-
alized strong ordinal potential. Unfortunately, even if aninfinite game has the LIP, Theorem 1 (and
in particular Corollaries 1, 2, and 3) need not hold as they rely on the existence of a strictly positive
parameterǫ that is a lower bound on the minimal performance gain of a member of a coalition per-
forming an improving move. In infinite games, however, such aonstant need not exist since strategy
sets are topological spaces and the minimal performance gain m y be unbounded from below.
We recall a famous result of Debreu [10], who showed that the lexicographical ordering on an
uncountable subset ofR2 cannot be represented by a real-valued function. It is easy to derive that
this also holds for the sorted lexicographical ordering as defined in Definition 3 as well. To see this,
suppose there is a real-valued functionα representing the sorted lexicographical order on [0,1]× [0,1],
in particularα represents the sorted lexicographical ordering on [2/3,1]× [0,1/3] where the sorted
lexicographical order and the lexicographical order coincide. Thus, we derive a contradiction.
This implies that a generalized strong ordinal potential need not exist in general. Still, we are able
to prove existence of SNE in infinite games having the LIP for acontinuousfunctionφ : X→ Rq+.
Theorem 5. Let G be an infinite game that satisfies the LIP for a continuousfunction φ. Then G
possesses a SNE.
The proof can be found in the appendix. This result establishes t e existence of a SNE in all infinite
gamesG = (N,X,π) with compact strategy spacesX that have the LIP for a continuous function
φ : X→ Rq+. Although the proof of Theorem 5 is constructive, the effort needed to compute a SNE in
such a game is very high as it involves the calculation of up toq! strategy profiles. We thus proceed
by investigating some special cases of infinite games possessing the LIP and identify cases in which
SNE can be computed efficiently.
5.1 Infinite Bottleneck Congestion Games
In this section, we introduce the ”continuous counterpart”of bottleneck congestion games. We are
given a congestion modelM = (N,F,X, (cf ) f∈F) with Xi = {xi1, . . . , xini }, ni ∈ N, i ∈ N, where as usual
everyxi j is a subset of facilities ofF.
FromM we derive a correspondinginfinite congestion modelIM = (N,F,X,d,∆, (cf ) f∈F), where
d ∈ Rn+, ∆ = ∆1× · · ·×∆n, and∆i = {ξi = (ξi1, . . . , ξini ) :
∑ni
j=1ξi j = di , ξi j ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,ni}. The strategy
profile ξi = (ξi1, . . . , ξini ) of player i can be interpreted as a distribution of non-negativeint nsities
over the elements inXi satisfying
∑ni
j=1ξi j = di for di ∈ R+, i ∈ N. Clearly,∆i is a compact subset
of Rni+ for all i ∈ N. For a profileξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn), we define the set of used facilities of playeri as
Fi(ξ) =
{
f ∈ F : there existsj ∈ {1, . . .ni} with f ∈ xi j andξi j > 0
}
. We define theload of playeri on f
under profileξ by ξ fi =
∑
xi j ∈Xi : f∈xi j ξi j , i ∈ N, f ∈ F. In contrast to finite bottleneck congestion games,






Definition 7 (Infinite bottleneck congestion game).Let IM = (N,F,X,d,∆, (cf ) f∈F) be an infi-
nite congestion model derived fromM. The correspondinginfinite bottleneck congestion gameis






Examples of such games are bottleneck routing game with splittable demands.
We are now ready to prove that infinite bottleneck congestiongames have theπ-LIP.
Theorem 6. Let G(IM) = (N,∆,π) be an infinite bottleneck congestion game. Then, G(IM) has
the LIP for the functionsφ : ∆→ Rn+ andψ : X→ Rmn+ defined as








cf (ℓ f (ξ)), if f ∈ Fi(ξ)
0, else
for all i ∈ N, f ∈ F.
The proof uses similar arguments as the proof of Theorem 3 in the previous section except, that we
now use the fact that cost functions are load-dependent and no - ecreasing.
We will now show that the above two functionsφ andψ may be discontinuous even if facility cost
functions are continuous.
Example 1.Let G(IM) = (N,∆,π) be an infinite bottleneck congestion game with continuous cost
functionsc. Then, the functionφ andψ as defined in Theorem 6 may be discontinuous on∆. Consider
a bottleneck congestion game with one player having two facilities ∆1 = {{r1}, {r2}} over which she
has to assign a demand of size 1. The facilityr1 has a cost function equal to the load, while facilityr2
has a constant cost function equal to 2. Letξ2(ǫ) = ǫ > 0 be assigned on facilityr2 and the remaining
demandξ1(ǫ) = 1− ǫ be assigned tor1. Then, foranyǫ > 0 we haveφ(ξ(ǫ)) = 2, whileφ(ξ(0))= 1.
By assuming that cost functions are continuous andstrictly increasing, we obtain, however, the LIP
for acontinuousfunctionν.
Theorem 7. Let G(IM) = (N,∆,π) be an infinite bottleneck congestion game with strictly increasing
cost functions. Then, G(IM) has the LIP for the functionν : ∆→ Rm+ defined asν f (ξ) = cf (ℓ f (ξ)) for
all f ∈ F.
We prove the theorem in the appendix.
This result relies on the strict monotonicity ofcf and cannot be generalized to non-strict mono-
tonic functions. We illustrate this issue with the following example. Consider a bottleneck congestion
game with two players having equal demands and two facilities F = { f ,g}, wherecf (ℓ) = 10 and
cg(ℓ) = ℓ. Both players may either choosef or g. Then
(
( f , f ), (g, f )
)
is an improving move for player
1 as his private cost decreases from 10 to 1. Howeverν
(







henceν is not lexicographically decreasing along this improving move. This example shows that
strict monotonicity is essential in the proof of the above thorem.
We overcome this problem by slightly generalizing the notion of lexicographical ordering to or-
dered sets that are different from (R,≤). To this end, consider a totally ordered set (A,≤A). Similar to
Definition 3, we introduce a lexicographical order onA-valued vectors. For two vectorsa,b∈ Aq, let
ã andb̃ be two vectors that arise from ofa andb by ordering them w.r.t≤A in non-increasing order.
We say thata isA-lexicographically smaller thanb, writtena≺A b if there ism∈ {1, . . . ,q} such that
ãi =A b̃i for all i <m andãm <A b̃m.
Consequently a strategic game satisfies theA-LIP if there areq ∈ N and a functionφ : X→Aq
such thatφ(x) ≻A φ(y) for all (x,y) ∈ I .
The following theorem establishes theA-LIP for infinite bottleneck congestion games, where
(A,≤A) = (R2,≤lex) and≤lex denotes the ordinary lexicographical order (that does not involve any
sorting of the entries) onR2, that is, (a1,a2) <lex (b1,b2) if either a1 < b1 or
(
a1 = b1 andb2 < b2
)
.
Theorem 8. Let (A,≤A) = (R2,≤lex) and let G(IM) = (N,∆,π) be an infinite bottleneck congestion
game. Then, G(IM) has theA-LIP for φ : ∆→Am defined asφ f (ξ) =
(
cf (ℓ f (ξ)), ℓ f (ξ)
)
for all f ∈ F.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 7. Let (ξ,ν) be an improving move. Again, we denote by
g one of the bottleneck facilities of that player of the coalition with highest cost before the improving
move. Instead of the strict monotonicity ofcg we use that in the casecg(ℓ(ξ)) = cg(ℓ(ν)), we still get





, proving the result.
Corollary 9. Let G(IM) = (N,∆,π) be an infinite bottleneck congestion game with continuous cost
functions. Then, G(IM) possesses an SNE.
Consider the functionφ as in Theorem 8. We observe thatφ is continuous as (cf ) f∈F is continuous.
Thus, a similar (but slightly more involved) proof as that ofTheorem 5 implies that there is strategy
profile ξ ∈ ∆ (where∆ is compact) that minimizesφ w.r.t. the order defined onA.
The above result establishes for the first time the existenceof SNE for a variety of games such as
scheduling games with malleable jobs, bottleneck routing games with splittable demands, etc. Note
that this result gives also an alternative and constructiveproof for the existence of PNE in bottleneck
routing games with splittable demands compared to the proofof Banner and Orda [5].
5.2 Approximate SNE
We introduce the notion ofα-approximatestrong Nash equilibria for infinite games. We denote by
Iα(S) ⊂ X×X the set of tuples (x, (yS, x−S)) of α-improving moves forS ⊆ N and define byIα their
union. A strategy profilex is anα-approximate strong Nash equilibrium if no coalition∅ , S ⊆ N
has an alternative strategy profileyS such thatπi(x)−πi(yS, x−S) > α, for all i ∈ S. We call a function
P : X→R anα-generalized strong ordinal potential if (x,y) ∈ Iα impliesP(x)−P(y)< 0.We also define
theα-lexicographical improvement property (α-LIP) andα-π-LIP similar to Definition 4, except that
we replaceI with Iα, respectively.
We will prove in the appendix that bottleneck congestion games with bounded cost functions
possess anα-approximate SNE for everyα > 0.
Theorem 9. Let G be an infinite bottleneck congestion game with bounded cost functions. Then, G
possesses anα-approximate SNE for everyα > 0.
Note that there is a fundamental difference to the result of Monderer and Shapley [24], who
showed that every infinite game having anexactbounded potential (on a compact strategy space)
possesses anα-PNE for everyα> 0. Monderer and Shapley use in their proof that the payoff difference
of a deviating player is equal to the potential difference. This, however, is not true for generalized
ordinal potentials and, in fact, we crucially exploit the combinatorial structure of infinite bottleneck
congestion games in the proof of Theorem 9.
We finally show that there is a polynomial algorithm computing anα-approximate SNE for every
α> 0 for the class of bottleneck routing games with splittable flow and bounded convex cost functions,
where the upper bound is polynomial in the input size.
Proposition 2. Consider a class of splittable bottleneck routing games on multi-commodity graphs
D = (V,A) with bounded convex arc-cost functions, that are bounded bya constant C, and players
having arbitrary positive demands. Then, there is a polynomial algorithm computing anα-SNE for
arbitrary α > 0.
Proof. Theα-generalized strong ordinal potential functionPM(α) as defined in Lemma 2 is convex
(asc is convex) and the flow polytope is compact. Thus, one can apply the same scaling argument
as in Proposition 1 to obtain a polynomial time algorithm (e.g., the ellipsoid method) computing a
splittable flowz that satisfiesPM(α)(z) ≤minξ∈∆PM(α)(ξ)− ǫ for arbitraryǫ > 0. ⊓⊔
6 Extensions
A natural generalization of bottleneck congestion games can be obtained by assuming that players
areheterogeneouswith respect to the cost of the most expensive facility, thatis, they attach different
valuesto the cost of the most expensive facility. We can model this heterogeinity by introducing a
player-specific function̟ i : R+→ R+ that maps the cost of a facility to the private cost experienced
by the player. Assuming that higher costs on facilities are associated with higher private costs, that is,
̟i is strictly increasing for alli ∈ N, we can actually show that these games possess the LIP (though
not theπ-LIP).
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove 1.⇒ 2.⇒ 3.⇒ 4.⇒ 5.⇒ 1.
1.⇒ 2. is trivial.
2.⇒ 3.: We use that every directed acyclic graph possesses a topological rder, which gives rise
to a generalized ordinal potential by simply assigning real-valued labels to strategy profiles according
to their topological order.
3.⇒ 4.: Let Q be a generalized ordinal potential function and letQmin =minx∈X Q(x) . We define
φ(x) = Q(x)+Qmin and it follows thatG together withφ has the LIP.
4.⇒ 5.: Let (x, (yS, x−S)) ∈ I (S),S ⊆ N be arbitrary and letφ be as in the definition of LIP. We






for all M < M′. To this end, we denote bỹφ(x) and φ̃(yS, x−S) the vectors that arise by sortingφ(x)
andφ(yS, x−S) in non-increasing order. Asφ(yS, x−S) ≺ φ(x), there is an indexm∈ {1, . . . ,q} such that



























′ − φ̃m(yS, x−S)M

















and get the claimed result.
5.⇒ 1. is trivial. ⊓⊔
Proof of Corollary 2





move (x,y) ∈ I . Here,m is the first index such that̃φm(x) > φ̃m(y). The mean value theorem implies















establishing the result. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let p,q ∈ N andp< q. As theLp-norm is decreasing inp and by Hölder’s inequality, we get
Lq(x) ≤ Lp(x) ≤
q√
nq−pLq(x), and for the special caseq =∞ we getL∞(x) ≤ Lp(x) ≤ p
√
nL∞(x). The
latter inequality implies that limp→∞ Lp(x) = L∞(x).
As G satisfies theπ-LIP, PM(x) =
∑
i∈Nπ(x)
M is a generalized strong ordinal potential ofG or all





i∈Nπ(x)M as well. AsX is finite, we can chooseM large enough
so that the strategy profilex∗ minimizesL∞(x).
For proving the second claim, letx∗ be a strong Nash equilibrium minimizing the generalized




i∈Nπ(x)M and lety be a strategy profile minimizingLp.







inequality is valid asx∗ is a potential minimizer. Thus,Lp(x∗) ≤ n1−p/MLp(y) < nLp(y), which proves
the claimed result. ⊓⊔
In the following we provide an example of a class of games withtheπ-LIP whose parameters can be
chosen in a way such that the price of stability w.r.t.Lp is arbitrarily close to
p
√
n, implying that the
result of Theorem 2 w.r.tL1 is tight.
Example 2 (Price of stability).We consider the gameG= (N,X,π) with N = {1, . . . ,n} with X1 = X2 =
{0,1} andXi = {0} for 3≤ i ≤ n. Private costs are shown in Fig. 1a.
It is straightforward to check that this game has theπ-LIP. The unique SNE is the strategy profile
(0, . . . ,0) realizing a private cost vector of (k− ǫ, . . . ,k− ǫ). For anyp∈N, there isǫ > 0 such thatLp(·)




So far, our results concern the price of stability only. The next example shows that games with the
π-LIP may have a price of anarchy that is unbounded.
Example 3 (Unbounded price of anarchy).Consider the gameG= (N,X,π) with N = {1,2}, X1= X2=
{0,1} and private costs given in Fig. 1b for anyk> 0. It is straightforward to check that this game has
theπ-LIP and that both (0,0) and (1,1) are SNE. Hence, the price of anarchy w.r.t. anyLp norm is
unbounded from above.
Proof of Corollary 5
We establish the result by proving the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let G be a finite strategic game having theπ-LIP. If the strategy profile x minimizes PM
as defined in Theorem 1 withφ = π, then x is min-max fair.
Proof. Let x minimizePM as defined in Theorem 1 withφ = π. Assume by contradiction that there is
another strategy profiley such thatπi(y) < πi(x) for somei ∈ N and the following two statements hold:
1. π j(y) ≤ π j(x) for all j ∈ N/{i} with π j(x) ≥ πi(x)
2. π j(y) < πi(x) for all j ∈ N/{i} with π j(x) < πi(x).
Then, we can observe that every entry ofπ(x), which is aboveπi(x) only decreases undery, while every
entry strictly belowπi(x) may only increase to a value strictly below the thresholdπi(x). Because the
valueπi(x) strictly decreases undery, we obtainPM(x)−PM(y) > 0 for M large enough, contradicting
the minimality ofx. ⊓⊔
0 1
0 (k− ǫ,k− ǫ,k− ǫ, . . . ,k− ǫ) (k,k,k . . . ,k)






Fig. 1. a)Private costs received by the players for strategy profilesX1×X2 of the game considered in Example 2.b) A game
with unbounded price of anarchy w.r.t. anyLp-norm.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We first prove the claim forψ. Consider an improving move (x, (yS, x−S)) ∈ I . Let j ∈ S be a
member of the coalition with highest cost before the improvement step, i.e.,j ∈ argmaxi∈Sπi(x). We
setΨ+ := {(i, f ) ∈ N×F : ψi, f (x) ≥ π j(x)} and claim thatψi, f (x) ≥ ψi, f (yS, x−S) for all (i, f ) ∈ Ψ+. To
see this, suppose there is (k,g) ∈ Ψ+ such thatψk,g(x) < ψk,g(yS, x−S). The independence of irrelevant
choices and the monotonicity of cost functions imply that a memberi ∈ S of the coalition usesg. So
π j(x) ≥ πi(x) > πi(yS, x−S) ≥ ψk,g(yS, x−S),
which contradicts (k,g) ∈ Ψ+.
Now we defineΨ− := {(i, f ) ∈ N×F : ψi, f (x) < π j(x)} and claim thatψi, f (yS, x−S) < π j(x) for all
(i, f ) ∈ Ψ−. To see this, suppose there is (k,g) ∈ Ψ− such thatψk,g(yS, x−S) ≥ π j(x). Because of the
monotonicity of the cost functions and the independence of irrelevant choices, there is a member
i ∈ S of the coalition usingg in (yS, x−S) giving rise to
π j(x) ≥ πi(x) > πi(yS, x−S) ≥ ψk,g(yS, x−S) ≥ π j(x),
which is a contradiction.
We remark thatN × F = Ψ+ ∪Ψ− and that we have shown thatψi, f (x) − ψi, f (yS, x−s) ≥ 0 for
all (i, f ) ∈ Ψ+S andψi, f (yS, x−S) ≤ ψk,g(yS, x−S) for all (i, f ) ∈ Ψ− and (k,g) ∈ Ψ+S . Since j ∈ S and
π j(x) > π j(yS, x−S), there exists (j, f ) ∈ Ψ+ with ψ j, f (x) > ψ j, f (yS, x−s). Hence,ψ(x) ≻ ψ(yS, x−S),
finishing the first part of the proof.
To prove the LIP forφ, we must show that (πi)i∈N ≻ (πi(yS, x−S))i∈N for all (x, (ys, x−S)) ∈ I . We
again consider a playerj ∈ argmaxi∈Sπi(x) and decompose the set of players into the sets
N+ := {i ∈ −S : πi(x) ≥ π j(x)} N− := {i ∈ N : πi(x) < π j(x)}.
A similar argument as in the first part shows thatπi(x)≥ πi(yS, x−S) for all i ∈N+ and thatπi(yS, x−S)<
π j(x) for all i ∈ N−, establishing the result. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We assign a uniform capacity of 1 to each arc∈ A. With the polynomial algorithm of Ed-
monds and Karp we obtain both a minimum (s, t)-cut C, and a maximum flowx. Let us say that
C := {a1, . . . ,am} for somem∈ N. As we may assume without loss of generality thatx is integer and
all capacities are 1, we may decompose the flowx into marc-disjoint pathsP j .










players are routed along





players are routed along each of the other paths. As all arcs have
the same arc-cost function, we derive thatπi(x) =maxa∈xi = ca(x) = caj (x) for some 1≤ j ≤m. Since
every other flow traverses the cutC, there can be no deviation of a coalitionS that is profitable to all
of its members, that is, strictly reduces their private costs. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Instead of computing a SNE in the original game, we consider th gameG̃ with arc-costs
c̃a(x) = ca(x)/C. Obviously, each strategy profilex∈ X establishes an integral (s, t)-flow with valuen.
Conversely, each such flow can be decomposed inton paths starting ins and ending int, see [2]. So,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between strategy profiles and integral (s, t)-flows with valuen.
Let na(x) denote the number of players using facilitya under strategy profilex. As the bottle-




















Fig. 2.a) Bottleneck routing game with multiple SNE b) Bottleneck routing game with non-strong PNE
∑
a∈A c̃a(x)
M na(x) is a generalized strong potential function of the bottleneck routing game, see the
construction of the generalized ordinal potential in Theorem 1. We can rewrite the potential using
flow variablesx : R|A|→ R+ and obtainPM(x) :=
∑
a∈A c̃a(xa)
M xa, wherexa denotes the total flow on
arca. Moreover, note that the optimization problem minx∈X PM(x) of computing a minimal integral
flow with convex arc-cost can be solved in polynomial time (given PM(x)), see Ahuja et al. [2]. The
optimal solutionx∗ of this problem minimizes the generalized strong potentialfunctionPM and hence
is a SNE. ⊓⊔
Examples 4 and 5
Example 4.Consider the symmetric bottleneck routing game with players s tN = {1, . . . ,n} depicted
in Fig. 2. The strategy setXi of each playeri ∈ N comprises all paths froms to t, that areP1 :=



















1 if ℓ ≤ 1
2 else.
and the graph depicted in Fig. 2a.
There are two types of SNE. In the first type,n−1 players playP1 and one player playsP2. The
players onP1 experience a cost of 0 while the single player onP2 experiences a cost of 1. Thus, the
sum of all costs equals 1. In the other type of SNE, againn−1 players playP1 while one player plays
P3. Hence all players experience a cost of 1 and the total cost ofall players sums up ton. The two
types of SNE actually correspond to the global minima of the generalized strong ordinal potential
functions derived from theπ-LIP w.r.t.φ andψ as defined in Theorem 3.
Example 5.Consider the instance in Fig. 2 b and assume there are two players with unit demand
each. One can easily see that this instance admits a PNE (routing both demands along the two zig-zag
paths) that is not a SNE. This example contrasts a result of Holzman and Law-Yone [15], who have
shown that for singleton congestion games, every PNE is alsoa SNE. Thus, allowing more complex
strategies (paths instead of single facilities) makes a structu al difference.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. By assumption there existsq ∈ N and a functionφ : X→ Rq+ such thatφ(yS, x−S) ≺ φ(x) for
all (x, (yS, x−S)) ∈ I ,. We will show that there existsxmin ∈ X with φ(xmin)  φ(y) for all x,y ∈ X. Our
proof is constructive and proceeds inq phases. In the first phase, we solve the following program
min
x∈X
α s.t. : φi(x) ≤ α, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,q}. (P1)
Note that continuity ofφ implies that the half-spaceH1 = {x ∈ X : φi(x) ≤ α} is compact. To see
this, observe thatH1 = φ−1i ((−∞,α]) = (φ
−1
i ((α,∞))
C, whereφ−1 denotes the pre-image ofφ and (A)C
denotes the complement ofA with respect toX. As φ is continuous and (α,∞) is openφ−1i ((α,∞)) is
open and henceH1 is closed. Hence,H1 is a closed subset of the compact setX and thus compact.
As the objective of (P1) is continuous, the minimum is attained inH1 with valueα1 ∈ R+. Let A1 ⊆ X
denote the set of optimal solutions and letB1 = { j ∈ {1, . . . ,q} : there existsx∗ ∈ A1 with φ j(x∗) = α1}
denote the set of indices for which the optimal value is attained. Clearly,B1 is non-empty. IfB1




α s.t.:φ j(x) = α1, φi(x) ≤ α, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,q} \ { j}. (P j2)
If, in contrast,B1 contains more than one element, we solve programP
j
2 for every j ∈ B1. Continuing
this way we obtain at mostq! different solution vectorsφ ∈ Rq+. Taking the lexicographically smallest
among them, we obtainxmin, which is a SNE. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. We choose a deviating playerj ∈ argmaxi∈Sπi(x) with highest cost before the improving move
and one of the facilitiesg∈ argmaxf∈xj cf (x) at whichπ j(x) is attained. DecomposeF into F+ andF−
defined asF+ := { f ∈ F : cf (x) ≥ cg} andF− := { f ∈ F : cf (x) < cg}. We claim thatcf (yS, x−S) ≤ cf (x)
for all f ∈ F+ and thatcf (yS, x−S) < cg(x) for all f ∈ F−, which establishes the result with similar
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3. Note that we use here that cg is strictly decreasing as player
j changes her strategy profile fromx j to y j . ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 9
We prove the theorem by stating a useful lemma.
Lemma 2. Let the functionψ : ∆→ Rmn+ be defined as








cf (ℓ f (ξ)), if f ∈ Fi(ξ)
0, else
for all i ∈ N, f ∈ F.
Moreover, letα > 0 and define PM(α)(ξ) :=
∑
f∈F,i∈Nψi, f (ξ)
M(α), where M(α) ≥ (2ψmax/α+1) log(nm)





)M(α) for all (ξ,ξ′) ∈ Iα.
Proof. We must show thatPM(α)(ξ)−PM(α)(νS, ξ−S) ≥
(α
2
)M(α) for an arbitraryα-improving move
(ξ, (νS, ξ−S)) ∈ Iα. Let j ∈ S with j ∈ argmaxi∈Sπi(νS, ξ−S).
We define
Ψ+ := {(i, f ) ∈ −S×F : ψi, f (ξ) ≥ π j(νS, ξ−S)} andΨ− := {(i, f ) ∈ −S×F : ψi, f (ξ) < π j(νS, ξ−S)}.
Claim. 1. ψi, f (ξ) ≥ ψi, f (νS, ξ−S) for all (i, f ) ∈ Ψ+
2. ψi, f (νS, ξ−S) ≤ π j(νS, ξ−S) for all (i, f ) ∈ Ψ−.
Proof. To prove the first claim, suppose there is (k,g) ∈ Ψ+ such thatψk,g(ξ) < ψk,g(νS, ξ−S). Because
of the monotonicity of cost functions there existsi ∈ S with g ∈ Fi(g) implying
π j(νS, ξ−S) ≤ ψk,g(ξ) < ψk,g(νS, ξ−S) ≤ πi(νS, ξ−S) ≤ π j(νS, ξ−S),
which is a contradiction.
For proving the second claim, suppose there is (k,g) ∈ Ψ− such thatψk,g(νS, ξ−S) > π j(νS, ξ−S).
Again, monotonicity of cost functions implies that there isi ∈ S with g∈ Fi(g) giving rise to
πi(νS, ξ−S) ≥ ψk,g(νS, ξ−S) > π j(νS, ξ−S) ≥ πi(νS, ξ−S),
which is a contradiction. This proves the claim. ⊓⊔











M(α)−ψi, f (νS, ξ−S)M(α).











ψi, f (νS, ξ−S)
M(α)
≥ (π j(νS, ξ−S)+α)M(α) − (nm)π j(νS, ξ−S)M(α),
where the first inequality follows from the non-negativity of ψ. The second inequality follows from
π j(ξ) ≥ π j(νS, ξ−S)+α and the second claim. To this end, we obtain
PM(α)(ξ)−PM(α)(νS, ξ−S) ≥ (α/2)M(α) + (π j(νS, ξ−S)+α/2)M(α) − (nm)π j(νS, ξ−S)M(α)
≥ (α/2)M(α),
where the last inequality follows from the choice ofM(α). ⊓⊔
Proof (Proof of Theorem 9).Fix α > 0. Then, since∆ is compact andPM(α) (as defined in Lemma 2) is




We claim thatz is anα-approximate SNE. Suppose not. Then there exists a profitable deviationνS ∈
∆S with PM(α)(z)−PM(α)(νS,z−S)≥ (α/2)M(α) > ǫ (by Lemma 2), which contradicts the approximation
guarantee ofz. ⊓⊔
